Recently I faced a dilemma: Is it ethical to use a fundraising strategy that contradicts the cause the fundraiser is supporting? For example, would it be wrong to host a bake sale to raise money to help fight diabetes if selling sugary treats means increasing the chances that the customers will become diabetic? The solution to this problem might seem easy – a bit of sugar is not such a bad thing – but it becomes more difficult when there are higher stakes. In an infamous case, Namibia auctioned off the right to hunt one of the native endangered black rhinos in order to raise money to enforce anti-poaching laws. In such cases, I find it useful to consult moral philosophy.

A first attempt would be to look to consequentialism, the most well-known theory of which is utilitarianism. This view says that when deciding whether or not to take an action, we ought to weigh the benefits against the detriments. In the case of the bake sale, it would mean asking whether hosting the fundraiser would still contribute overall to the fight against diabetes, even once the negative effects of eating unhealthy treats are factored in. Assuming that such a calculation were possible, the solution to a consequentialist would be simple: Host the bake sale. In other words, one step backward and two steps forward. However, this account might seem unsatisfactory when applied to the rhinos. Is the guarantee of future protection of the rhinos a good enough reason to kill one in the present?

The two most common objections to consequentialism generally fall under the other two major traditions in moral philosophy: deontology and virtue ethics. Deontology, pioneered by Immanuel Kant, argues that an action is morally good when it follows a good rule or a “deon.” Therefore, according to a deontologist, if it is wrong to kill a rhino, then auctioning off the kill of a rhino would be morally wrong, even it meant saving the lives of more rhinos in the future.

Interestingly, this conception aligns with a prominent Jewish moral philosophy called “tzedakah,” which translates roughly as “justice.” If a person partakes in tzedakah, he or she does not need to be concerned with the consequences but only with respecting an obligation or duty. This can be contrasted with the common moral philosophy in Christianity known as “charity,” which instead emphasizes the importance of fostering a disposition to do good things. That is to say, a person who subscribes to this conception of charity would be acting morally even if she killed a rhino, so long as she had good intentions.

Nevertheless, a person with the same moral philosophy might argue for the exact opposite. This distinction helps to understand virtue ethics. Suppose someone were to protest the license-to-kill-rhino auction by claiming, “What kind of message does this send?” In this case she would be arguing from the perspective of virtue ethicists. These philosophers believe that the most important thing in moral philosophy is not to ask about rule-following or effect-weighing, but to ask, “Is this an action good person would take?” In the case of the rhinos, a virtue ethicist might argue that auction is immoral because it might lead people to mistake Namibia’s pro-rhino intentions for anti-rhino ones.

In the end, most people will find that each account is compelling in its own way. If this seems like a cop out, let me explain. Though none of the moral philosophies will produce one easy ultimate answer, they can help find ways out of the vicious circles of argument. Although fiery debates may be inevitable when discussing fundraising for an important cause, an appeal to moral philosophy can make for a more tempered and lucid discourse.

Jonathan Roach is a Weinberg sophomore. He can be reached at [email protected]. If you would like to respond publicly to this column, send a Letter to the Editor to [email protected].